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jurisdiction, effectively ignoring the jurisdictional argument while produc-
ing a result that is difficult to square with the statutory jurisdictional grant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of Southland Royalty is in one respect merely another
chapter in a history of expanding jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act.
Deeper analysis reveals, however, that it presents a significant change in
the judicial treatment of the Act. The decision is the first to authorize
Commission jurisdiction in an area not within the express statutory catego-
ries. As such, it presents an application of quasi-judicial legislation un-
precedented under the Natural Gas Act.
David G. Drumm
Cities Liable Under Section 1983: Monell v. Department of
Social Services
Female employees of the city of New York brought a class action' in the
district court of New York against the Department of Social Services and
its Commissioner, the Board of Education and its Chancellor, and the city
of New York and its Mayor, alleging violation of constitutional rights as
protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 The individual defendants were sued
solely in their official capacities. The complaint challenged the constitu-
tionality of the official state policy that compelled petitioners to take un-
paid maternity leaves before such were necessitated by medical reasons.
Petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages for dep-
rivation of the right of employment as well as for back pay. The district
court held that subsequent changes by these agencies in maternity leave
policy mooted the claim for injunctive and declaratory relief.3 As to the
to the interpretation that any successor in interest to dedicated gas could avoid dedication if
sales were stopped on May 31, 1978.
1. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 357 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The
court, in a memorandum opinion, denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but did
agree to designate their claim as a class action in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The
district court held the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot since the
change in policy removed any definite controversy that must exist before judicial determina-
tion is appropriate. This requirement is mandated by the Constitution, which limits the
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claim for lost wages, the district court concluded that while the petitioners'
constitutional rights had indeed been violated,4 there should be no recov-
ery because, if allowed, the city of New York would bear ultimate financial
responsibility, thus circumventing the immunity granted municipalities by
the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape.5 The court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal,6 concluding, first, that neither the Department of Social Services
nor the Board of Education were "persons" within the meaning of section
1983 and, secondly, that although the defendant officials were "persons"
under section 1983, they could not be sued for damages in their official
capacity if any sum awarded would ultimately be paid by the city.7 Upon
grant of certiorari,8 the case came before the Supreme Court. Held,
reversed: Municipalities and other local government units were intended
by Congress to be "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. Conse-
quently, such local government units can be sued directly under section
1983 for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Monroe v. Pape, in-
sofar as it holds that such local government entities are wholly immune
from suit under section 1983, 9 is overruled. Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
I. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 1983
A. Early Development
Judicial interpretation of section 19831° has focused on legislative his-
exercise of the judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
For a discussion of the doctrine of mootness, see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 240-41 (1937) ("[t]he controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal rela-
tions of parties having adverse legal interests"). See also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S.
244, 246 (1971); Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Missouri, 361
U.S. 363, 367 (1960).
4. 394 F. Supp. at 855. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the
Supreme Court held that mandatory cut off dates for maternity leaves violated the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment by creating a "conclusive presumption" that a wo-
man in her fourth month of pregnancy is physically unable to continue employment. See
generally Comment, Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 260 (1972); Comment, Mandatory Maternity Leave of Absence Poli-
cies-An Equal Protection Analysis, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 240 (1972).
5. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976).
7. Id at 266. The court stated that "the mere substitution of the name of the official
for the name of the city in the complaint cannot be used as a subterfuge to circumvent the
intent of Congress." See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (finding that it was
well established that even though a state is not named party to action, suit will be barred
where recovery will ultimately come from the state); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (stating that "[wihen the action is in essence one for the
recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is
entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nom-
inal defendants").
8. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 429 U.S. 1071 (1977). Certiorari was denied,
however, on plaintiffs motion to apply 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V 1975) retroactively. The
Supreme Court restricted certiorari to the questions regarding § 1983.
9. The Court reaffirmed Monroe as to its holding that a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
10. Section 1983 was originally enacted as Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
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tory in an effort to determine what Congress intended when it passed the
statute." Therefore, to facilitate an understanding of recent cases, an
analysis of the historical setting and the congressional debates from which
section 1983 emerged is necessary.' 2 The Reconstruction period that fol-
lowed the Civil War witnessed Southern resistance to the idea of extending
constitutional protection to former slaves.' 3 Such resistance often took the
form of deliberate inactivity by state and local officials in the wake of deni-
als of personal liberties that enabled organized terrorism to gain momen-
tum.' 4 The Forty-second Congress responded to this situation by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was designed broadly to
enforce the guarantees and protections expressed in the Constitution,"
specifically, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments,' 6 by ad-
ding civil remedies to the criminal penalties established by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.' 7 The uncontroversial nature of section 1983 led to its pas-
sage in Congress as introduced, with little debate.'" Consequently, legisla-
tive history relating specifically to section 1983 is limited; however, other
provisions of the statute were extensively debated both as to the wisdom
and constitutionality of such legislation, and, thus, provide much of the
historical background of the entire Act.' 9
In particular, extensive debate focused on a proposed amendment to the
Ii. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 581-86 (1976);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 433 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 384-85 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507,
517-20 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 704-10
(1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 167 (1961).
12. But see Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 533 (1964) ("[h]istory does not provide the answers to
the problems of today; it merely helps to frame the questions"). See generally C. MILLER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 200 (1969).
13. See Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133,
1153-56 (1977).
14. Id Congressional concern was exemplified by the remarks of Rep. Lowe: "While
murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishment have
been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
374 (1871). Atrocities committed by the Ku Klux Klan caused great concern among con-
gressional members. Id at 153-57, 198-202, 236-40. See generally Shapo, Constitutional
Tort." Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277, 279-80 (1965).
15. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 569. ("[Section 1983 is] so very simple and [is]
really reenacting the Constitution.") (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). See generally Wiecek, The
Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishes slavery and involuntary servitude); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (guarantees privileges and immunities of citizenship, due process, and
equal protection); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (guarantees right of citizens to vote).
17. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976)); Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)).
Congressional debates showed no constitutional objection to the addition of civil penalties
through § 1983. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 824 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). See
also CONG. GLOBE app., 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 67-71 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
See generally Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1488 & n.14 
(1969).
18. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 522, 709.
19. 436 U.S. at 665.
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Civil Rights Act of 1871 by Senator Sherman.2 ' The Sherman Amend-
ment proposed to make both municipalities and its citizens strictly liable
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 2 Opponents of the Sherman Amend-
ment argued that Congress had no authority to impose a new obligation on
municipalities to keep the peace. 22 McCulloch v. Maryland23 and Kentucky
v. Dennison24 were urged as support for the position that Congress was
prohibited from imposing on state officers new duties that might interfere
with state activity. Opponents further distinguished imposition of a new
duty from an imposition of civil liability for failure to enforce the Consti-
tution. Since the federal courts had enforced the contract clause2 5 against
municipalities, 2 6 reasoning such enforcement merely vindicated the Con-
stitution, critics of the amendment conceded that Congress did have the
constitutional power to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hold
20. See CONG. GLOBE app., supra note 17, at 220, 335-36 (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
The Sherman Amendment was not an amendment to § 1983 but was to be a separate section
of the Act.
21. The Sherman Amendment would have imposed strict liability on the municipality
and its citizens for the actions of each citizen irrespective of whether the constitutional depri-
vations were perpetrated under color of state law. The original version of this amendment is
stated in CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 663. Although the Senate passed the amendment,
the House refused to accept the change, forcing the bill to a conference committee. The first
committee substitute exempted citizens from liability, and allowed municipal liability only
where a judgment recovered by a plaintiff remained unsatisfied. CONG. GLOBE, supra note
14, at 749. This amended version was again rejected by the House. Note, Damage Remedies
Against Municipalities For Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 947 n. 132 (1976).
22. Rep. Blair stated this position:
[Tihere are certain rights and duties that belong to the States . . . there are
certain powers that inhere in the State governments. They create these munic-
ipalities, they say what their powers shall be and what their obligations shall
be ....
[Ilt is not within the power of the Congress. . . to lay duties upon a
State officer ...
CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 795. Although legislative debate never specifically focused
on what exactly this new duty entailed, the major concern was that it mandated more than
what was required by the Constitution. Rep. Burchard argued:
[T]here is no duty imposed by the Constitution. . . upon a county to protect
the people of that county against the commission of the offenses herein enu-
merated, such as the burning of buildings or any other injury to property or
injury to person. Police powers are not conferred upon counties as corpora-
tions; they are conferred upon cities that have qualified legislative power. And
so far as cities are concerned, where the equal protection required to be af-
forded by a State is imposed upon a city by State laws, perhaps the United
States courts could enforce its performance. . . . [Biut they [the counties] do
not have any control of the police ...
Id. at 795. Whatever this new duty specifically involved, it was clear that Congress was
concerned that imposing new obligations on the officials would make them so overburdened
with federal duties, that they would neglect their state obligations. ld at 799.
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
24. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, which provides: "No State shall ... pass any. ..
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. .. "
26. For cases upholding the power of federal courts to enforce the contract clause
against municipalities, see Board of Supervisors v. United States ex rel. Durant, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 415 (1870); United States ex rel. Benbow v. Mayor of Iowa City, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 313
(1869); Board of Supervisors v. United States ex rel. Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 175 (1869);
Board of Comm'rs v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1861).
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cities liable.17 Since, however, the Forty-second Congress viewed section
1983 as merely imposing liability on municipalities for using their author-
ized powers in violation of the Constitution, the question of whether or not
a new duty was imposed was not at issue.
The Sherman Amendment, as finally passed, made any person who had
knowledge of the wrongs conspired to be done and power to prevent those
wrongs, but who neglected to exercise that power, liable to the person in-
jured;2 8 thus abandoning the concept of municipality liability, and thereby
avoiding the previous constitutional objections.
In the absence of direct legislative history of section 1983, many federal
courts applied the above background of the Sherman Amendment by neg-
ative inference, which resulted in a restriction of the scope of section 1983.
These narrow, negative constructions were made despite the fact that this
section was intended to provide a broad civil remedy to anyone deprived
of a constitutional right under color of state law.29 In restricting the appli-
cation of section 1983, the concern seemed to be that a broad reading
would allow the federal government to usurp the power of the states 3°
through the imposition of new duties on municipalities, an imposition that
had been flatly rejected during the Sherman Amendment debates. Narrow
interpretations of the constitutional rights protected by the statute and a
restrictive view of the concept of "under color" of state law3, were the
traditional methods used by the courts to limit the application of section
1983.32 The modern trend has been to shift emphasis from the rights pro-
tected and the presence of state action to other provisions of section 1983, 33
specifically, the definition of "person" for purposes of defining the scope
27. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 794-95 (remarks of Rep. Poland and Rep.
Burchard).
28. Id. at 804.
29. CONG. GLOBE app., supra note 17, at 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
30. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1191.
31. The acts of a government official can be "under color" of state law in violation of
federal civil rights even if that official's actions are not in violation of that state law. Thus, it
is irrelevant to consider whether the state had authorized the wrong. See Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). See also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S.
278 (1913). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-4 (1978).
32. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1156-61, 1191. Cases narrowly interpret-
ing the constitutional rights protected include: United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases),
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (held legislation unconstitutional as beyond the power of Congress to
enforce the fourteenth amendment because it was directed against private discrimination);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (held the fourteenth amendment could
reach the conduct of state governments and officials, but could not reach that of private
persons); Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing (Slaughterhouse
Cases), 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (held interests protected by the fourteenth amendment
were limited to only those rights related to the existence of the national government). Cases
claiming deprivations "under color" of state law usually involved actions clearly within a
command of state law. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Bowman v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 115 U.S. 611 (1885); Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885).
33. See Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1191. Decisions have begun to re-
quire requisite states of mind before finding liability. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976). Other decisions have created limits on availability of relief once liability is estab-
lished. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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and extent of liability under section 1983. Such a significant restriction of
"person" occurred in Monroe v. Pape; thus, further analysis of the meaning
of the word "person" must begin with consideration of that case.
B. Monroe v. Pape
In Monroe v. Pape Chicago police officers illegally entered the Monroes'
home, harassed the family, and ransacked the house.34 The family
brought suit against the policemen and the city of Chicago under section
1983.31 The Supreme Court held that while the complaint stated a cause
of action against the police officers, the city was not a "person" within the
meaning of section 1983, and therefore, was immune from suit.36
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, relied solely upon legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in determining that cities were im-
mune from the coverage of section 1983.37 Congressional objections to the
constitutionality of the Sherman Amendment38 were interpreted by the
Court to mean that the congressional intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
was not to impose liability upon municipalities. Justice Douglas con-
cluded that "[t]he response of the Congress to the proposal to make munic-
ipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by
the [Civil Rights] Act of April 20, 1871 was so antagonistic that we cannot
believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include
them. , 3
9
C. Post -Monroe Development
Many circuit courts attempted to avoid the restrictive holding in
Monroe. The most significant attempt was to apply Monroe only to suits
for damages.4' The Supreme Court in City of Kenosha v. Bruno,41 how-
ever, struck down such a "bifurcated" approach to municipal liability,
42
although it did implicitly appear to state that jurisdiction for purposes of
municipal liability could be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 133 1.43 Thus, sev-
34. 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
35. Id at 170.
36. Id at 187-92.
37. Id at 170-91.
38. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 804 (remarks of Rep. Poland). See also text
accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
39. 365 U.S. at 191 (footnote omitted).
40. See, e.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970); Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Adams v. City of Park
Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
41. 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
42. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the definition of "person" was not "intended to
have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the
relief sought." Id. at 513. By contrast, Justice Douglas's dissent viewed Monroe as resting
on congressional concern that only damage liability would seriously interfere with local gov-
ernment activity. Justice Douglas, therefore, read Monroe as "containing dicta that a rem-
edy by way of declaratory relief or by injunction is barred by § 1983." Id at 516.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) provides that: "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
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eral cases arose in federal courts urging that jurisdiction under section
1331 was warranted where an action against a municipality was founded
upon the Constitution." Most federal courts relied on Monroe's finding
that municipal liability was a deliberate legislative choice and, therefore,
denied recovery against the city.45 Another strategy was based on 42
U.S.C. § 1988,46 which provides that where federal law is ineffective to
implement the Civil Rights Acts, reference may be made to state law pro-
vided the state law is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States. The lower courts held that if the municipality was liable
under state law, then, in essence, federal law was presumed to be ineffec-
tive to implement the Civil Rights Act, and thus reference to state law was
allowed.4 7 This approach amounted to bootstrapping of municipality lia-
bility into section 1983. In Moor v. County of Alameda,48 however, the
Supreme Court clearly rejected this rationale. The Court found that sec-
tion 1988 was enacted merely to complement section 1983 and not to pro-
vide independent protection of civil rights.49 The Court refused to review
its holding in Monroe in light of policy arguments for a more liberal inter-
pretation.5" These Supreme Court decisions, although justified by stare
decisis, have not only restricted attempted expansions of the section 1983
remedy, but have also resulted in barring claims against "entities resem-
bling municipal corporations."'" As a result, most component municipal
agencies have been sheltered by Monroe's immunity since they are merely
extensions of the municipality.52 Further, if a state agency is but a subdi-
vision of the state so that liability would be recovered indirectly from the
$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States."
44. See Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Smetanka v. Borough of
Ambridge, 378 F. Supp. 1366 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Perzanowski v. Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223 (D.
Conn. 1974). But see Bosely v. City of Euclid, 496 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1974).
45. See Perry v. Linke, 394 F. Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1974). In Perzanowski v.
Salvio, 369 F. Supp. 223, 229-30 (D. Conn. 1974), the court further rejected applicability of
the analysis in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the
Supreme Court held that an implied cause of action for violation of constitutional rights
arose under the general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in § 1331. The Bivens
doctrine was rejected since § 1983 reflected an affirmative congressional judgment that cities
were to be immune. See also Washington v. Brantley, 352 F. Supp. 559 (M.D. Fla. 1972);
Payne v. Mertens, 343 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See generally Dellinger, Of
Rights and Remedies." The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532 (1972).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
47. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973). But see Gonzalez v. Doe, 476
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1973); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
908 (1973). See generally Note, Civil Rights-Section 1983-Municipality Subject to Section
1983 Damage Suit if Local Law Recognizes Municipal Liability, 24 VAND. L. REV. 1252
(1971).
48. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
49. Id at 702-06.
50. Id at 701-02.
51. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1194.
52. See Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1244 (6th Cir. 1974) (city plan-
ning commission); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach,
493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (local planning board).
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state, that agency has been granted immunity as well. 3 The Supreme
Court sensed the tensions arising from its decision in Monroe and, finally,
granted certiorari to hear Monell v. Department of Social Services in order
to reconsider the question of whether municipalities and other local gov-
ernment units are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.
II. MONELL V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
In Monell v. Department of Social Services Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority,54 reviewed the Court's previous holding in Monroe, and con-
cluded that a fresh analysis of the legislative history of section 1983 re-
vealed that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be "persons" within section 1983."
In overruling Monroe, the Court first emphasized that section 1983
passed both the House and Senate as introduced. 6 Congressional debate
centered on other provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, thus evidenc-
ing congressional satisfaction with the wisdom and constitutionality of sec-
tion 1983. Further, while Monroe placed great weight on congressional
rejection of the Sherman Amendment, the Monell Court emphasized that
the Sherman Amendment was not an amendment to section 1983, but was
to be a separate section of the Civil Rights Act of 187 L" Therefore, at the
time the House rejected the Sherman Amendment, section 1983 was not
under consideration, having already been passed verbatim by both
Houses.
A review of the congressional debates convinced the Court that the con-
stitutional objections raised against the Sherman Amendment58 did not
prohibit the federal government from holding municipalities liable for in-
fringement of federal rights as opposed to imposing new duties. The Court
noted that even the opponents of the Sherman Amendment, who had con-
tended that a new duty resulted from the imposition of liability, conceded
that when a state had already imposed a duty to keep the peace, municipal
53. See Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 201 (9th Cir. 1974); Cheramie v. Tucker, 493
F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974). See Developments in the Law,
supra note 13, at 1194 n.35. As to school districts and boards of education, most courts have
held that they are not analogous to state agencies, political subdivisions, or municipal corpo-
rations and, thus, have imposed liability. See Aurora Educ. Ass'n E. v. Board of Educ., 490
F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974); Scher v. Board of Educ., 424
F.2d 741, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1970). But see Adkins v. Duval County School Bd., 511 F.2d 690,
692-93 (5th Cir. 1975); Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429, 430 (4th Cir.
1974). See generally Comment, Suing the School Board Under Section 1983, 21 S.D.L. REV.
452 (1976).
54. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell. Justice Stevens joined in Parts I (legislative history analysis), III (stare decisis dis-
cussion), and V (the holding), but stated that Parts II (respondeat superior analysis) and IV
(limits of the decision) were merely advisory and, therefore, not necessary to explain the
Court's decision. 436 U.S. at 660. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist's dissent was
joined by Chief Justice Burger.
55. Id at 665.
56. Id. See also text accompanying notes 15-18 supra.
57. The Sherman Amendment was to be added as § 6 of the bill. See note 20 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
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liability was constitutionally permissible. Congress, therefore, could con-
fer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear suits against municipalities based
on a violation of that pre-existing duty. 9 Congress merely intended sec-
tion 1983 to impose liability on a municipality for acting under color of
state law in violation of the fourteenth amendment under the Constitution,
a duty that the state was already obliged to meet.6" Section 1983, unlike
the Sherman Amendment, was not intended to impose a new obligation on
municipalities.6 Thus, the constitutional bar that existed for the Sherman
Amendment was not present for section 1983.62
Secondly, the fact that some Congressmen had opposed the Sherman
Amendment yet supported section 1983 convinced the Court that there
was no constitutional objection to section 1983.63 Congressional debate of
section 1983, although limited, conclusively indicated it was intended to be
enforced against state or municipal officials who interfered with constitu-
tional rights while acting under color of state law.' Further, at the time of
these debates, the Court had held that the federal government could
neither impede the state nor interfere with its instrumentalities, including
officers and agents.65 Thus, the Court reasoned that those who voted for
section 1983 must have believed these Supreme Court decisions posed no
constitutional barrier.
Finally, the Court concluded that the doctrine of dual sovereignty did
not limit the power of the federal courts in enforcing the Constitution
against municipalities.66 Where the Constitution had guaranteed a right, a
remedy was required for violations of that right, and it logically followed
that Congress had the power to ensure that remedy.67 Holding municipali-
ties liable for constitutional violations, therefore, was a proper exercise of
that power and did not violate the doctrine of dual sovereignty.68
59. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 794-95 (remarks of Rep. Poland and Rep.
Burchard). Congress, relying on contract clause precedents, recognized that this power to
confer jurisdiction was constitutional. See note 26 supra. See also text accompanying notes
25-27 supra.
60. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 14, at 701, 794-95, 799.
61. See text accompanying notes 20-28 supra.
62. The Court concluded that Congress did not see any constitutional barrier to holding
municipalities liable for "using their authorized powers in violation of the Constitution."
436 U.S. at 679-80.
63. Id. at 682-83.
64. See CONG. GLOBE app., supra note 17, at 216-24 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). See
also Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1880) (the Court held that the principle of
federalism did not prohibit the enforcement of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment in suits
against state officers in the federal courts).
65. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
66. 436 U.S. at 680-82. To the 42d Congress, the doctrine of dual sovereignty placed
limits on the powers of the national government in favor of protecting state prerogatives.
The doctrine created an area that was exclusively under state control and an area exclusively
under federal control, thus establishing two areas of sovereignty. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616 (1842).
67. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616 (1842).
68. 436 U.S. at 680-83; see text accompanying notes 22-24 supra. See also the contract
clause discussion in text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
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Through application of appropriate rules of construction, the Court fur-
ther substantiated its position by concluding that the general language of
"any person" in section 1983 covers legal as well as natural persons. Since
section 1983 was a remedial statute, in that it provided a civil remedy for
all persons deprived of constitutional rights, rules of construction man-
dated a liberal reading.6 9 The Court next emphasized that by 1871, the
year in which section 1983 was enacted, courts were holding, albeit in dif-
ferent contexts, that municipal corporations were "persons";7 further,
Congress had recently passed a statute providing that the word "person"
may extend to "bodies politic and corporate."'" Thus, by 1871 it was es-
tablished that municipalities should be treated as natural persons within
the "plain meaning" of section 1983.72 The Court, therefore, concluded
that the usual meaning of the word "person" extended to municipal corpo-
rations, bringing such governmental units within the ambit of persons lia-
ble under section 1983. 7"
The Court, however, limited the liability of municipalities by holding
that Congress did not intend such governmental units to be held liable on
a respondeat superior theory whereby an employer is held liable for the
torts of an employee acting within the scope of his employment.74 The
language of section 1983, "any person who . . . shall subject, or cause to
be subjected," imposes liability only when a government, acting under
color of law, causes an employee to violate another's constitutional rights.
Further, the "creation of a federal law of respondeal superior would have
raised all the constitutional problems associated with the obligation to
keep the peace' 75 that Congress thought was unconstitutional.76
The Court, applying the most stringent test for overruling a "statutory"
decision,77 found that it appeared beyond doubt that the Monroe Court
misapprehended the meaning of section 1983.78 The majority commented
that municipalities could not assert a reliance claim to support a grant of
69. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 429
(5th ed. 1891); see CONG. GLOBE app., supra note 17, at 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
70. See Board of Supervisors v. Cowles, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121 (1869); Louisville, C.
& C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844). See also CONG. GLOBE, supra note
14, at 752 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger), 777 (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
71. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
72. 436 U.S. at 687.
73. Id at 688-89.
74. Id. at 691-95. The Court's explanation of respondeat superior, however, is confus-
ing in that it provides that a "municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor." (Emphasis by the Court.)
75. Id at 693.
76. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
77. This test was proposed by the court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The
test provided that "it [must] appear beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871
statute that. . . [the Court] misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision." Id
at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. 436 U.S. at 700-01. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the ma-
jority that the Court misapprehended the meaning of § 1983 in Monroe. Id at 705. Justice
Powell stated it was unlikely that Congress intended public officials to be "exclusively" lia-
ble for constitutional injury. Id. at 707.
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absolute immunity,79 since municipalities are not allowed to "'arrange
their affairs' on an assumption that they can violate constitutional
rights."8 The Court further concluded that there was no constitutional
impediment to municipal liability, stating that " '[t]he Tenth Amendment's
reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a
federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful
state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment.' "81 National
League of Cities v. Usery,82 therefore, was irrelevant to the Court's consid-
eration of Monell.83 The majority, consequently, found no justification for
excluding municipalities from the persons subject to suit under section
1983.84
Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented, stating that the
Court was bound by Monroe by considerations of stare decisis, which are
strongest when the Court confronts its previous construction of legisla-
tion. 5 The majority, however, noted that the immunity principle estab-
lished in Monroe was itself a departure from prior practice, whereby
municipalities and school boards had been held liable under section
1983.86 The dissent concluded that Monroe was not a departure from prior
practice since in previous decisions allowing suits against municipalities
and school boards, the jurisdictional question had been passed upon sub
silentio s7 Unconsidered assumptions of jurisdiction did not outweigh
Monroe and its progeny,8 8 which refused to hold that municipalities were
"persons" within the meaning of section 1983. As to congressional intent,
79. Id. at 699-700.
80. Id. at 700.
81. Id. at 690 n.54 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)); see Exparte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1880).
82. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
83. 436 U.S. at 690 n.54. The Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), that Congress could not prescribe state minimum wages and maximum
hours since that would amount to congressional interference with the states' functioning in
the federal system of government established in the Constitution. The Court concluded
Congress could not interfere with the states' control of integral governmental functions.
84. 436 U.S. at 701. Such interpretation accords with the meaning given the word "per-
son" as used by Senator Sherman in antitrust legislation. See Layfayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 394-97 (1978); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of
Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
85. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175 n.12 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974). At present, Monroe has been cited over 1,350 times,
86. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1941); City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117
F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1941); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393
(C.C.N.D. 11. 1873) (No. 10,336). See also note 53 supra.
87. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). In neither decision was the question
whether a municipality is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 raised by any of the
litigants or addressed by the Court. See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974)
("when questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this
Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdic-
tional issue before us").
88. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). See also Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-79 (1977).
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the dissent conceded that a closer analysis in Monroe of the meaning of
section 1983 might have yielded a different conclusion, yet "the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment remain[ed] instructive in that here alone did
the legislative debates squarely focus on the liability of municipal corpora-
tions, and that liability was rejected., 89 Accordingly, the dissent would
uphold Monroe's immunity principle, leaving its abolition to the legisla-
ture, which is better equipped to consider the results such a drastic change
in the law would have on municipalities and, in particular, on their limited
treasuries and insurance premiums.9°
In its broadest sense, the decision in Monell greatly expands section 1983
relief by providing plaintiffs with a wide range of financially responsible
defendants. The conclusion reached by the Court in Monell is desirable
because it is in keeping with congressional intent that section 1983 be a
broad remedial device. Nonetheless, the Court's method for attaining this
result may subject the Court to some degree of criticism. First, the infor-
mation concerning section 1983 available to the Court was the same in
both Monell and Monroe, and yet the two decisions arrive at opposite re-
sults. This is not to say that once the Court decides a point of law, it is
forever bound; however, when a statute is interpreted by the Court, subse-
quent congressional silence is thought to signify congressional approval, or
at the very least, acquiescence. Yet circumstances surrounding Monell re-
veal that in 1978 the Senate held hearings, which were recessed subject to
call,9 ' on a bill to remove the municipal immunity established in Monroe.
The fact that Congress had subsequently considered such legislation and
yet failed to pass it is some evidence of congressional intent to leave mu-
nicipalities immune from suit under section 1983. The Court's decision,
therefore, seized the issue from Congress and shifted the burden of passing
legislation to the opponents of municipal liability. Where there is legisla-
tive stalemate, the Supreme Court has its way. Of more practical impor-
tance, however, are the consequences of the Court's decision, which at this
time are difficult to predict. The Court specifically declined to address
what "the full contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be."92
Thus, since questions of qualified immunity and availability of common
law defenses for municipalities are left unanswered, the full resolution and
interpretation of Monell is left to the lower federal courts. 93
III. CONCLUSION
The decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services is truly
landmark in that it greatly expands the availability of section 1983 relief
for any citizen deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law.
This decision may have a substantial impact on municipalities, their lim-
89. 436 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. 124 CONG. REC. D129 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1978).
92. 436 U.S. at 695.
93. Id. at 713-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
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